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the 
This is 
Proceedings 
second of a case involving judgment denying real 
property an award of damages against the seller and awarding the buyer a judgment against a 
title company that prepared an inaccurate legal description of the real property." Cwnmings v. 
S'teplzens, et. al., 157 Idaho 348, 351, 336 281,284(201 ("Cwnmings T'). After trial the 
seller Steven Cummings ("Cummings") appealed and the title company Northern Title Company 
of Idaho, Inc. ("Northern Title") cross-appealed. The Court affirmed the district court's denial of 
Judgrnent against the seller ("Roger Stephens"), and reversed Cummings' Judgment against 
Northern Title. See Cummings I, 157 Idaho 348, 336 P.3d 281. 
On remittitur, Northern Title renewed its pre-appeal motion for costs and The 
court found and Cummings not dispute that Northern Title is the party, 
Cummings is not a prevailing party, and Roger Stephens is still a prevailing party. Upon 
determining each party's prevailing party status, the district court awarded Northern Title its pre-
appeal costs and Pursuant to Rule 60(b), Northern Title then moved and the district court 
vacated Cummings' Judgment and prior award of costs and fees. 
1. The District Court Awarded Cummings with One Judgment. 
At trial, Cummings alleged that Roger Stephens and Northern Title filed a correction 
deed, and thereby "breached the warranties of title in the Original Deed, converted the 83 acres 
lying east of the highway, and slandered Mr. Cummings' title to the real property." See 
Curnmings I, 157 Idaho at 353, 336 P.3d at 286. Moreover as to Northern Title, Cummings 
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it escrow 
or 
title insurance." Id. Cummings pined that "Stephens and Northern Title him 
emotional distress." Id. 
At the of Cummings' case in chief, Roger Stephens (the seller) moved for 
dismissal. Cummings not elected to call Roger as a nor had 
Cummings called any of the realtors. See Cummings I, 157 Idaho at 356, 336 P.3d at 289. 
Instead, "Cummings only offered the testimony of the manager of Northern Title ... [ who J 
testified that Mr. Stephens did not participate in the modification ... [i]n fact, there was no 
evidence he was even when those changes were made or knevv that they were to be 
"Id. at 157 Idaho at 355-356, 336 P.3d at 288-289. The district court granted the request, 
dismissing Roger Stephens. 
to Northern Title, trial continued and district court later issued its forty-eight ( 48) 
decision. The district court found one judgment against Northern Title, based solely on one 
source of liability. judgment did not Northern Title's actions as a title 
insurance agent. 1 Nor did the judgment implicate Northern Title as the escrow agent.2 Instead, 
l Cummings I, 157 Idaho at 367, 336 P.3d at 300. ("Northern Title did not act negligently in 
performing any action insofar as it relates to its business as an insurance agent"). 
2 The district court was incensed that Northern Title was an escrow agent and yet had 
unilaterally filed a corrective deed that excluded the property east of Highway 30. The district 
court went so far as to describe the conduct as willful misconduct, or gross negligence. See 
Cummings I, 157 Idaho at 368-369, 336 P.3d at 301-302. (J. Jones, dissenting). But the effect 
was nil. The correction had excluded property east of Highway 30, and the district court found 
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court to 
relied. 
s q c, 
,ms willing to an additional $50,000 . . . order to purchase 
was the entire Stephens situated on both sides of the 
highway. This came based upon the negligent of the legal 
description by Northern Title that identified land on the east side of the 
highway. The only harm that the Court can conclude that is outside the 
of speculation is that has proximately harmed by this 
negligence in an amount of $50,000. 
Cummings I, 157 Idaho at 365, 336 P.3d at 298. (quoting district court). 3,4 
2. The Court Denied Cummings' Appeal. 
Cummings appealed, asserting that the district court erred by (1) involuntarily dismissing 
Roger Stephens; (2) holding Roger Stephens as a prevailing party; (3) not upholding the original 
(4) not quieting Cummings' title to the eastern property; (5) not recognizing a tort of bad 
faith; (6) Cummings' (7) not awarding Cummings with additional damages; 
and (8) not awarding Cummings with punitive damages. See Cummings I, 157 Idaho 348, 336 
P.3d 281. 
(and Cummings never disputed) that "[1] the rerecorded deed that excluded property on the east 
side of Highway 30 is not a false statement ... [2] the property on the east side of the highway 
was never intended to be sold by Stephens ... [3] the real estate deal did not include property 
east of the Highway ... [4] Cummings has no right to recover any property, value, or interest 
for the Stephens' property located on the east side of the highway." Cummings I, 157 Idaho at 
362, 336 P.3d at 295. In addition, "Cummings did not provide any evidence regarding the value 
of the property on the east side of the highway." Id. 
3 Emphasis and ellipses added. 
4 The same can be found in Cummings I, R. Vol 8, p. 1627; see also Larson v. State, 435 P.2d 
248, 249, 91 Idaho 908, 909 (1967). (Court can take judicial notice of prior appeal record). 
RESPONDENT NORTHERN TITLE - 3 
to court 
an on was no 
evidence that Mr. Stephens altered the deed"; thus "Cummings has not shown that the district 
court abused its discretion in finding that Mr. Stephens was the prevailing party regarding the 
claims brought against him." Cummings I, 157 at 353-360, 336 P.3d at 286-293. As to the 
district court's purported failure to recognize the original (non-corrected) deed and to quiet 
Cummings' title to the eastern property, "Cummings did not assert any claim for quiet title ... 
[and] failed to prove that the transaction between him and Mr. Stephens included the sale of the 
property on the east side of the highway." Id. at 157 Idaho at 357, 336 P.3d at 290. In other 
words, Cummings had failed to assert, let alone prove such claims. 
More particularly as to Northern Title, the Court found that the existence of a "tort of bad 
faith" against Northern Title as the escrow was irrelevant. The district court had expressly 
found, and Cummings did not dispute that Northern Title "acted in good faith," and reasonably 
denied claim; the only information Northern Title had received was "Cummings only 
received property on the west side of Highway 30 ... [i]t was testified extensively at trial that 
Northern Title's understanding was that only the property on the \vest side was involved in the 
transaction." Cummings I, 157 Idaho at 359, 336 P.3d at 292. Based on 
uncontested findings, there had been no bad faith. 5 
district court's 
5 See also fn. 2, supra, regarding Cummings' failure to prove his breach of contract claim 
against Northern Title as escrow. 
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was to 
\\'ith eastern property. Cummings did not dispute his 
to that eastern property: 
property on the east side of the highway was never intended to be sold ... 
Cummings was therefore never entitled to receive this property ... was never the true 
owner of the property ... has no claim over that property, value of that property, or any 
interest generated from that property the form of CRP payments or otherwise ... [and] 
did not provide any regarding the value of the property .... 
Cwnmings I, 157 Idaho at 362-363, 336 P.3d at 295-296. (quoting district court). 
Cummings' last but no less futile arguments were that the district court erred in (I) 
excluding his valuation expert, and (2) punitive damages. Here again, however, Cummings 
failed to appreciate the circumstances. Cummings had vehemently argued for and gained the 
exclusion of Northern Tile's valuation expert, being disclosed two (2) months late. In contrast, 
"Cummings was more dilatory .. uv•~u~,.,,., his disclosure was about three months late ... [and] 
the district court clearly set forth what it required ... [and warned that] witnesses not disclosed . 
. . will be excluded at trial." Cummings I, 157 Idaho at 360, 336 P.3d at 293. Therefore, the 
exclusion was proper. Id. at 157 Idaho at 361, 336 P.3d at 294. As to punitive damages, the 
district court before trial denied Cummings' request to amend, and though such was done 
"without prejudice, Cummings did not renew his motion at trial "nor did he ever renew it." 
Cwnmings I, 157 Idaho at 364, 336 P.3d at 297. The, punitive damages were waived. 
3. The Court Reversed Cummings' Judgment. 
As to the only source from which harm could be identified, the district court found that 
Northern Title was an "abstractor," liable for negligently drafting a deed description: 
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on 
negligent preparation of legal 
identified land on the east side of the highway. 
that the Court can conclude that is outside the realm of speculation is that 
Cummings has been proximately harmed by this negligence in an amount of 
$50,000. 
Cummings/, 157 Idaho at 365, 336 P.3d at 298. (quoting district court, emphasis added). 
, the "legal description created by Northern Title [ \Vas] in the of 
performing the title work to be done in order to issue a commitment for title insurance." "There 
[was] no evidence that Northern Title assumed the duty of being an abstractor title." 
Cummings I, 157 Idaho at 366-367, 336 P.3d at 299-300. Because Northern Title had no duty as 
an abstractor, the district court's finding of negligence was error. Id. at 157 Idaho at 367, 336 
P.3d at 300. Therefore, the Court reversed Cummings' one and only judgment. Jc/. 
Concise Statement qf'Facts 
On November 5, 2014, the remitted this matter and ordered the district court to 
"forthwith with directive of the Opinion, if any action is required." Vol. 1, p. 21. 
Northern Title rene\ved motion 
held "there's no way I can hold 
costs and fees, and on January 2015 the district court 
plaintiff as a prevailing party, and I find that Northern 
Title prevailed .... " Tr., 32:15-18. (emphasis added). Later that same day the district court 
entered its Minute Entry & Order, holding that "Defendant Northern Title is the prevailing 
party" and awarding Northern Title its pre-appeal costs and fees. R., Vol. 1, p. 61. 
On January 6, 2015, the district court filed its Amended Final Judgment on Costs and 
Fees as Between Cummings and Northem Title. R. Vol. 1, pp. 63-64. However, the judgment 
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same amount costs as to 
at pp. id. at p. 61 (Northern Title to $1 .62). on 
8, 2015 the district court entered its Amended Final Judgment on Costs and Fees as 
Between Cummings and 1'/orthem Title. Id. at pp. 65-66. 
Unfortunately, the record was still incomplete. The Court (on appeal) had awarded 
Northern Title its costs and see R., Vol. 1, pp. 29-30 ($25,829.68), which the district court 
failed to include. Therefore on January 27, 2015, the district court entered its Third Amended 
Final Judgment on Costs and Fees as Bet,veen Northern Title, adding Northern Title's costs and 
on appeal. Id. at pp. 67-68. (bringing total cost and fees to $162,363.30). 
Northern Title then learned that Cummings' old $50,000 Judgment, and his judgment for 
costs and fees, were still both on record with the Bear Lake County of Idaho. Further, opposing 
refused to remove them. On February 5, 2015, and pursuant to Rule 60(b) of Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Northern Title requested the district court to vacate Cummings' 
$50,000 Judgment (as ordered by this Court) and his prior costs and fees. (as ordered by the 
district court). R., Vol. 1, pp. 69-70. Cummings objected, arguing that despite this Court's 
order to reverse his $50,000 Judgment and despite the district court's subsequent orders, 
Northern Title was too late and its motion was "baseless." Id. at p. 73. The district court 
disagreed and vacated the judgments. Id. at 76-77. 
RESPONDENT NORTHERN TITLE - 7 
1. of Cummings' Judgment the court 
jurisdiction to determine prevailing party status, costs, and attorneys fees? 
Cummings' judgment was reversed, Northern Title and not Cummings was the prevailing party: 
It just seems to me like I don't have much choice here but to go this way. And I'm 
not saying I wouldn't got this way if it was discretionary. It is discretionary. 1 am 
exercising my discretion ... where after the Supreme Court's decision that said 
that it was wrong of me to award 50,000 to the plaintiff, there's no way I can hold 
plaintiff as a prevailing party, and I find that Northern Title prevailed and 
order the cost and fees as I've outlined below. 
Tr., Vol. 1, 32:10-18. 
Whether the district court had jurisdiction is a question of law, over which this Court 
exercises free review. See Downey Chiropractic Clinic, 127 Idaho 283,285,900 P.2d 191, 193 
(1995). 
2. Whether Cummings has adequately raised that the district court abused its 
discretion in granting Northern s request for Rule 60(b) relief; and if so, whether the district 
court in fact abused its discretion and whether any such abuse was harmless? 
Standard of Review: Cummings raises this issue only in passing. Appellant's 
Brief at 9-10. To even consider an issue for review, assignments of error must be asserted with 
particularity and supported by sufficient authority; a general attack will not do. See Bach v. 
Bagley, 148 Idaho 784,790,229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010). 
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15, court was 
it is no 
given 
1, p 
an abuse discretion standard: 
to to I.R.C.P. 1s 
The upheld if it appears that the 
the issue as discretionary, (2) acted within 
and 
1058, I 
not the error is 
, 151 261 
I I J are instructed to error not the 
rights a party"). 
Costs on appeal are awarded as a matter right. See I.AR. 40. Attorneys fees on appeal 
are awarded if authorized by statute, contract, or rule. See Capps 1·. FIA Card Services, NA., 149 
Idaho 797, 744, 240 P.3d 583, 590(2010) (citations omitted); see also I.AR. 41. 
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) 
Appellant's 18. an award attorney to 
prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial." Clzave::, v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 225, 192 P.3d 
1036, 1049 (2008). Should Northern Title prevail on appeal, the Court pursuant to I.AR. 1 
and LC. § I 120(3) should award Northern Title its costs as a matter of right and its attorneys 
incurred in litigating a commercial transaction. 
Alternatively, Cummings' appeal is without merit, and therefore pursuant to LC. § 12-
123, Northern Title is entitled to attorneys fees on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT 
PREVAILING 
JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE 
ATTORNEYS FEES, AND COSTS. 
Cummings raises only one standard of review "free review." Appellant's Brief, 9. 
Cummings argues that the district court did not 
correct the prevailing party status, 
post-appeal jurisdiction to determine and 
On appeal, Cummings does not contest any of 
the district court's particular findings or conclusions. Most notably, (1) Cummings is not a 
prevailing party; (2) Northern Title is the prevailing party; and (3) Northern Title is entitled to 
pre-appeal costs and fees of $136,533.62. 
A. On reversal qf Curmnings' Judgment, the district court had post-
appeal jurisdiction to correct its orders, including those regarding 
prevailing party status, attorneys fees, and costs. 
Ordinarily, the district court determines prevailing party status, costs and fees shortly 
after trial: 
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or 
the action in relation to the relief sought ... the extent to which each party 
prevailed ... and upon so finding apportion the costs betrveen and among the 
parties in a fair equitable manner .... " 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). (emphasi and ellipses added). The application of Rule 54, hov;ever, can 
be extended. For instance "[a]fter a general reversal, a trial court is free to correct any error in its 
original findings and conclusions as to matters not passed on by the appellate court." Hutchins v. 
State, 100 Idaho 661, 666, 603 P.2d 995, 1000 (1979). 
Obviously, the reversal of a judgment, especially the only judgment, can strongly impact 
a district court's prior determination of prevailing party status, costs, and Therefore, it is 
well established that upon reversal the district court is empowered "to make a determination of 
what party was the prevailing party and whether the prevailing party was entitled to attorney 
"Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Nortlnvest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 413-474, 36 P.3d 
218, (2001). 
Here, the district court clearly had post-appeal jurisdiction to determine prevailing party 
status, costs, and and make any corrections necessary to its prior orders. By vvay of trial, 
Cummings had obtained one Judgment, and on appeal the Court reversed that Judgment. See 
Cummings I, 157 Idaho 348, 336 P.3d at 330. Therefore, the district court on remittitur had 
jurisdiction to reassess and make any corrections necessary in relationship to prevailing party 
status, costs, and fees. See Great Plains Equip. Inc., 136 Idaho at 413-474, 36 P.3d at 225-226. 
Cummings, however, argues that prevailing party status, costs and fees were not issues 
subsidiary to this Court's reversal. See Appellant's Brief; 9-17. In making his argument, 
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on V. , 132 11 ( 1 
court no authority to enter any or not in with the 
order of the appellate court." Id. at 132 Idaho at 833, 979 P.2d at 1191. Under this rule, the 
Court vvent on to hold that the district court's post-appeal jurisdiction did not include pre-appeal 
costs and fees; it was limited to the "ministerial act" of entering judgment as directed. Id. 
However, this case and Hummer are clearly distinguishable. Namely in Hummer, the 
Court did not reverse a judgment. Rather as stated in Hummer I, 129 Idaho 274, 923 P.2d 981 
( 1996), the Court vacated an additur of damages. Id. Thus in Hummer II, "the issue of attorney 
fees was not a subsidiary issue fairly comprised therein." Hummer II, 132 Idaho at 832-833, 979 
P.2d at 1190-1191. In stark contrast here, the Court Cummings I affirmed the district court's 
dismissal of Roger Stephens, and express! y held: 
We reverse the judgment against Northern Title ... his judgment against Northern 
Title must be reversed .... [and again] we reverse Mr. Cummings's judgment 
against Northern Title. 
Cwnmings I, 157 Idaho at 367, 336 P.3d at 300.6 Therefore, unlike Hummer this case involves 
the reversal of Cummings' one and only Judgment, leaving the district court to correct any 
error in its original findings and conclusions as to matters not passed on by the appellate court." 
Hutchins, 100 Idaho at 666, 603 P.2d at 1000. 
In addition to logic, the district court's jurisdiction is supported by Rule 54 which leaves 
the determination of prevailing party status, costs and fees to the "trial court." I.R.C.P. 54(1 )(B). 
Notwithstanding, Cummings tenuously interprets Hummer to stand for the proposition that even 
6 Brackets and ellipses added. 
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a s not costs 
court expressly changes prevailing or vacates a 
cost VoL 1, p. 55; see also Appellant's Brief, 10-11, 16. 
support, Cummings cites to (3) cases and none them support his proposition. 
instance in J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics International, Inc., 126 Idaho 532, 887 P.2d 1039 
( I on first appeal vvas requested and declined to prevailing party status. 
Id. at 259. On second appeal, the Court held: 
[W]hen this Court reversed the jury verdict ... relieving Chemetics of liability, the 
question of attorney fees was a "subsidiary issue fairly comprised therein." On 
remand the district court had the jurisdiction to consider whether Chemetics 
,vas the prevailing party and to make an award of costs and attorney fees. 
J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics Intern., Inc., (U.S. Inc.), 939 P.2d 574, 577, 130 Idaho 255, 258 
(Idaho 997).7 Similarly here, the district court had denied "all of Cummings's claims against 
336 P.3d at 286. (emphasis added). 
Because that one successful claim was founded on an erroneous theory of abstractor liability, the 
Court reversed. Id. at 157 Idaho at 367, 336 P.3d at 300. Therefore like in Chemetics, the district 
court had jurisdiction to reconsider pre-appeal costs and fees, and correct orders as necessary. 
What Cummings fails to appreciate is that the district court's post-appeal jurisdiction is 
found as a result of the reversal, not as a result of an appellate court's decision to pass on or 
decide issues relating to prevailing party status, costs, or fees. For instance, in Great Plains 
Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corporation, 132 Idaho 754, 771, 979 P.2d 624, 644 
7 (emphasis, brackets, and ellipses added). 
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(1 statute no 
of the prior , the passed on 
issue of prevailing party. On subsequent appeal, the Court agreed that because of the reversal the 
district court was 
and whether was " Great Plains Equip., 
Inc., 136 Idaho at 41 36 P.3d at 225-226. (emphasis added). 
In contrast here, while the Court found that Northern Title was not an abstractor, and thus 
Cummings' one and only Judgment could not stand. Such did not, ipsofacto, dictate the 
appropriateness of trial fees awarded under Idaho Code § l 120(3). The underlying transaction 
was still a commercial transaction, justifying an of See Cummings I, 157 Idaho at 
368, 336 P.3d at 300. Furthermore, the reversal did not ipso facto dictate that Cummings was 
100% no longer a prevailing party. As Justice Jones argued in his dissent, the Court did not 
overturn the district court's finding that Northern Title's actions constituted negligence, gross 
negligence, or willful misconduct in relationship to the escrow agreement. Cummings I, 157 
Idaho at 368-369, 336 P.3d at 301-302. (J. Jones, dissenting). 8 
Simply put, upon reversal of a judgment district court's post-appeal jurisdiction to 
consider costs and fees is not lessened by the fact that the determination will require some 
discretion. For instance Sky Canyon Properties, LLC v. Go(f Club at Black Rock, LLC, 155 
Idaho 604, 315 P.3d 792 (Idaho 2013), the Court reversed the judgment but also the award of 
8 But see also fn. 2, supra. (regarding district court's ample reasoning of why such conduct could 
not amount to a judgment). 
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was not to contract 
the \Vere Id. 9 the district court 
jurisdiction to address costs and and on subsequent appeal the Court pointed out (again) that 
of the reversal, district court had jurisdiction to pre-appeal costs and fees. 
See Sky Canyon Properties, LLC v. Golv Club at Black Rock, LLC, 44216 (Sept. 30, 2015). The 
was so in fact that the Court ordered a new judge to be appointed, and Justice 
Eismann's concurring opinion at the first bold header stated "[t]he District Court Had Post-
Appeal Jurisdiction to Determine the Prevailing Party and Award Costs." /d. 10 
Here, the district court did just that and Cummings does not dispute its findings: 
It just seems to me like I don't have much choice here but to go this way. And 
I'm not saying I wouldn't got this way if it was discretionary. It is discretionary. 
I am exercising my discretion ... where after the Supreme Court's decision that 
said that it was wrong of me to award 50,000 to the plaintiff, there's no \Vay I can 
hold the plaintiff as a prevailing party, and I find that Northern Title prevailed and 
order the cost fees as I've outlined below. 
Tr., Vol. I, 32:10-18. 
Cummings' argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction is without merit. The 
Court reversed Cummings' one and only judgment and the district court therefore had 
jurisdiction to determine and correct any orders regarding prevailing party status, costs and fees. 
9 Notably, at that first appeal the Court did not address pre-appeal prevailing party status, nor the 
amount of costs or fees. Id. 
l O Emphasis in original. 
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Cummings I, Northern argued that if it prevailed on court 
should be ordered to make Northern Title the prevailing party. , the Court did not 
address the issue in its Opinion, holding "[b ]ecause the remaining issues raised by Northern Title 
in its cross-appeal sought to reverse the award of damages other reasons, we need not address 
those issues." Cummings I, 157 Idaho at 367, 336 P.3d at 300. After the Court issued its 
Opinion, Northern Title petitioned for a rehearing requesting the to address Northern 
Title's pre-appeal prevailing party status, costs and attorneys fees. See R., Vol. 1, 6-14. Without 
comment, the Court denied the request. Order Re Additions to Clerk's Filed in 
District Court (Aug. 27, 2015). (taking judicial notice of the order). Cummings argues that by 
denying Northern Title's petition for rehearing, the Court decided the issue on the merits. 
Appellant's Brief, 11. 
Obviously, the Court's order denying Northern Title's request for a rehearing was not a 
decision on the merits. As Rule 54 to the Idaho Rules of Civil clear, prevailing 
party status and the award of costs and rests the sound discretion of the trial court. See 
I.R.C.P. 54(l)(B). Furthermore, "[a]fter a general reversal, a trial court is free to correct 
error in its original findings and conclusions as to matters not passed on by the appellate court." 
Hutchins, 100 Idaho at 666, 603 P.2d at 1000. 
In this case, Counsel for Cummings admitted on remittitur that Cwnmings I was silent as 
to pre-appeal prevailing party status, costs, and fees: 
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COURT: 
OLSEN: 
COURT: 
OLSEN: 
COURT: 
OLSEN: 
COURT: 
OLSEN: 
COURT: 
OLSEN: 
COURT: 
OLSEN: 
How? Couldn't it just as likely be the Supreme Court saying, "We're not 
going to even address this our prior opinions in other cases make 
this clear?" 
Well, I think, your Honor, it's important to remember, too, that Northern 
Title filed a cross-appeal on all of those issues. 
I understand that. 
And they did not - that appeal was not granted. 
Was it even addressed though? 
Well, I would say, your Honor, that -
Show me in the opinion where it said anything about that. I didn't find it. 
Well, in the opinion, your Honor, it does indicate in the procedural history 
part of it that, they did appeal that 
But where did the Supreme Court address that issue? 
And that I can't say. It doesn't specifically address it, other than that 
it denied their petition for rehearing. 
And I agree. They clearly denied the petition for rehearing, but I 
think it's saying a lot to interpret why they denied it. 
Right. 
Tr., Vol. 1, 4:21-5:25. 11 The Court's silence was just that- silence. A discretionary matter was 
left to the district court, the district court exercised its discretion and Cummings does not dispute 
11 Emphasis added. 
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(1) not a lS 
lS costs of $136,533.62. 
The Court should deny Cummings' appeal. The Court's Opinion reversed Cummings' 
one and only Judgment, was silent as to pre-appeal prevailing party status, costs, and and 
thus the district court properly exercised its post-appeal jurisdiction. LR.C.P. 54. 
Upon remittitur, the district court's jurisdiction was limited to subsidiary 
issues not passed on but fairly comprised within the Court's Opinion. 
A district court does not "have to discretionary the case simply 
Remittitur allowed the district to comply with 'the directive of the Opinion, if 
action is ,,, , 979 P.2d at 1191, 132 Idaho at 833. even in the event 
of a general reversal, the district court is still only to correct any error in its 
and conclusions as to matters not passed on appellate court." Chemetics, 130 
Idaho at 257-258, 939 
(emphasis added). 
at 576-577. Hutchins, l 00 Idaho at 666, 603 at 1000)) 
Cummings' court seek out a lS 
without merit. 
Cummings' claims against Northern Title "except one." See Cummings I, 157 Idaho at 353, 336 
P.3d at 286. 12 That one successful claim was "[t]he that the district court could 
identify, and it was reversed. ld. 13 On appeal, Cummings did not contest the district court's 
12 Emphasis added. 
13 Emphasis added. 
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was no as an 
14 
never intended to sell, and did not include the eastern property; 
Cummings had zero entitlement to the eastern property; or that Cummings failed to provide any 
of value. 15 did Cummings dispute that Northern Title . d -F • h 16 m goo ,mt . 
Thus, the time for Cummings to address and seek out a "correct theory" \Vas at trial or at 
on his first appeal, not nmv Ade v. Batten, 126 Idaho 114, 117, 878 813,816 
(Idaho App. 1994). (holding Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for timely appeal). Cummings 
nonetheless pines that if the district court has jurisdiction to consider pre-appeal costs and fees, it 
should "have been afforded ... consideration of a reinstatement of damages based on a correct 
theory[.]" Appellant's Brief; l 7-18. For at least three (3) reasons, Cummings' argument fails. 
First, the district court's post-appeal jurisdiction was limited to correcting its original 
findings and conclusions, i.e. conflict with this Court's decision. See Chemetics, 130 Idaho 
at 257-258, 939 P.2d at 576-577. On his first appeal, Cummings challenged the district court's 
( 1) dismissal of Roger Stephens; (2) purported failure to uphold the original deed; (3) purported 
failure to quiet title; ( 4) decision that Roger Stephens was a prevailing party; (5) refusal to 
recognize a tort of bad faith; (6) exclusion of Cummings' expert at trial; (7) purported failure to 
award Cummings with additional damages; and (8) purported failure to award punitive damages. 
14 See Curnmings I, 157 Idaho at 367,336 P.3d at 300. 
15 Id. 
16 ld. 
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I. error, as to 
no error. 17 court not 111 was 
no need for a correction of those denials. Further, where there was no need for correction there 
\Vas no post-appeal jurisdiction. See Chemetics, 130 Idaho at 257-258, 939 P.2d at 576-577. 
Second, even if a "correct theory" existed, Cummings does not raise it. Clear 
5'prings Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790,812,252 P.3d 71, 93 (2011). ("this Court will 
not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal"). Below, Cummings never moved the 
district court to consider alternative theories of relief. Instead, he vaguely asserted that "[i]f the 
proceedings are re-opened, would then prevent Cummings from seeking a reinstatement of 
damages based upon some other theory than abstractor of title?" R., Vol. 1, 55. What that "other 
theory" might be Cummings did not say. Similarly on appeal, Cummings vaguely asserts that "a 
reinstatement of damages based on a correct theory would not be inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court's Opinion." Appellant's Brief; 18. Again, Cummings does not even suggest a "correct 
17 Cummings I, 157 Idaho at 353-367, 336 P.3d at 286-300. (holding district court sufficiently 
addressed reasons for dismissing Stephens, and evidence "was sufficient for the district court to 
find that Mr. Cummings has failed to prove his claims against Stephens"; "[t]he district court 
did not make any ruling regarding the validity of the Original Deed"; Cummings waived claim to 
real property during trial, did not dispute the finding that he was not entitled to the property, and 
"did not assert any claim for quit title ... or to void the Corrective Deed"; "Cummings has not 
shown that the district court abused its discretion in finding that Mr. Stephens was the prevailing 
party"; Cummings failed to prove bad faith where he failed to challenge any of the district 
court's findings; "in excluding Mr. Cummings's expert witness ... the district court acted in a 
manner that was consistent with the applicable legal standards"; "district court did not err in 
failing to award him additional damages; Cummings "waived any claim" for punitive damages; 
"he has not prevailed on appeal") 
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to 
it. 
Third, Cummings' suggestions are inconsistent \vith this Court's Opinion. Under the 
"right result - wrong theory rule," if the "lower court reaches the correct result by an erroneous 
theory, this Court will affirm the order on the correct theory." Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. 
Mussell, 139 Idaho 28, 72 P.3d 868, 873 (Idaho 2003). (citation omitted); see Idaho ~"1"clz. 
for Equal Ed. Opp. v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573,580, 850 P.2d 724, 731 (1993). In fact, "[t]his 
Court must uphold the finding and judgment of the trial court if it is capable of being upheld on 
any theory." Berry v. Koehler, 86 Idaho 225, 233, 384 P.2d 484, 489 (1963). In Cummings I, the 
Court did not uphold the district court's judgment on an alternative theory because it could not. 
In fact, the Court expressly ordered that the "judgment against Northern Title must be reversed." 
Id. at! 57 Idaho at 367, 336 P.3d at 300. (emphasis added). The suggestion, therefore, that the 
district court should have jurisdiction to rummage for alternative theories to keep Cummings' 
Judgment alive is not "a subsidiary issue fairly comprised" within the Court's Opinion. Hummer, 
Idaho at 832-833, 979 P.2d at 1190-1191. 
The Court should deny Cummings' appeal. The district court was ordered to reverse 
Cummings' Judgment, and his vague suggestion that the district court had post-appeal 
jurisdiction to rummage for an "other theory" is without merit. 
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argues that the district court did not have post-appeal jurisdiction to entertain 
Rule 60(b) relief. Importantly, Cummings does not contest any of the district court's findings or 
conclusions. Most notably, (1) Cummings' $50,000 Judgment and judgment of costs and fees 
for $112,448.09 are void, and (2) the prospective application of these judgments would be 
inequitable. See R., Vol. 1, p 77. Instead, Cummings' sole argument is that pre-appeal costs and 
fees were not an issue fairly subsidiary to this Court's reversal, and thus the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to entertain a request for Rule 60(b) relief. Appellant's Brief; 10-14. 
Northern Title's response to Cummings' jurisdictional argument is contained supra. 
Therefore, Northern Title limits the following to those arguments Cummings made in passing, as 
contained Appellants' Brief; pp. 9-10. 
A. Curmnings raises this issue only in passing and 
give credence to his ernpty argument. 
the Court to an on the appellant's 
Court should not 
contain, 
argument section, the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, 
the reasons therefor, with the citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and 
record relied upon." I.A.R. 35(a)(6). 
Cummings does not adequately assign an error against the district court for granting 
Northern Title's request for Rule 60(b) relief. First, Cummings does not raise the applicable 
standard of review, and does not dispute the district court's findings. Cummings never argues an 
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to overturn a s 
's 
' 1 at 192 P.3d at 1061 (stating 
for review). Cummings dispute that his costs and fees were rendered void and 
became inequitable upon the district court's subsequent finding that Cummings is not a 
prevailing party. See Tr., Vol. I 32: 1 18 (holding Cummings is no longer a prevailing party); 
see R., Vol. 1, p. 61 (holding "Defendant Northern Title is the prevailing party"); see also 
Id. at p. 77. ("void" and inequitable). 
Second, Cummings does not make a cognizable argument. For Cummings to raise an 
he must at least ( 1) assert assignments of error with particularity and (2) support his 
position with sufficient legal or record authority. 
Where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with particularity and 
to support his position with sufficient authority, those assignments of error are too 
indefinite to be heard by the Court. general attack on the findings and 
conclusions of the district court, without specific reference to evidentiary or legal 
errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue. This Court will not search the record on 
appeal for error. Consequently, to the extent that an assignment of error is not 
argued and supported in compliance with the I.A.R., it is deemed to be waived. 
· 18 Baclz, 148 Idaho at 790, 229 P.3d at 1152. (emphasis added). 
In only one paragraph, Cummings vaguely alleges that Northern Title's motion lacked 
"good cause." Appellant's Brief, 10. Why it lacks good cause Cummings does not say. Further, 
Cummings cites to the record only once, nonsensically referencing to the last page of Northern 
Title's Rule 60(b) motion and the first page of Cummings' response. Id. at 10. (citing R. Vol. 1, 
18 Citing Randall v. Ganz, 96 Idaho 785, 788, 537 P.2d 65, 68 (1975); Michael v. Zehm, 74 
Idaho 442,445,263 P.2d 990,993 (1953); Suits v. Idaho Bd. of Pro.fl Discipline, 138 Idaho 397, 
400, 64 P.3d 323, 326 (2003); Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005)). 
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not even to s 
Vol. 1, 
In contrast, this Court has repeatedly held will not consider assignments of error not 
supported by argument and authority in the opening brief." Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 559, 
130 P.3d 1087, 1097 (Idaho 2006). Cummings is fully aware of this rule. See e.g. Cummings I, 
157 Idaho at 362, 336 P.3d at 295. (refusing to address Cummings' unsupported arguments). 
(quoting Hogg, 142 Idaho at 559, 130 P.3d at 1097). Where Cummings has failed to provide the 
Court (and this Appellant) with the most basic of supported argument, the Court should disregard 
Cummings' general, unexplained attack. 
The Court should not consider Cummings' bald attack against the district court's Rule 
60(b) relief. Cummings fails to cite or address the abuse of discretion standard, does not contest 
the district court's findings, and does not point to or support any assignable error with 
particularity. 
B. Notwithstanding, the district court's order granting Northern Title's 
request.for Rule 60(b) relief supported by the law the record. 
i. The district court's order granting Northern Title's request 
for Rule 60(b) relief was lawful. 
Under Rule 60(b)(5), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure "provides a means of obtaining 
relief from a final judgment which is based on a prior judgment that has been reversed, or 
otherwise vacated, or if it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application." Stuart v. State, 128 Idaho 436,437, 914 P.2d 933, 934 (1996). (quoting LR.C.P. 
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Rule lS 
see also V. 153 Idaho 157, 163, P.3cl 1 190 201 (to 
void means court "lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter"). 
First, the district court properly found that Cummings' $50,000 Judgment is void. 
Court ordered that the Judgment "must be reversed." Cwnmings I, 157 Idaho at 353, 367, 336 
at 286, 300. When this Court orders a , "[a] trial court no authority to enter any 
judgment or order not in conformity with the order of the appellate court." Hummer, 132 Idaho at 
979 P.2d at 1191. Therefore, when Northern Title motioned the district court to vacate 
Cummings' Judgment, the district court lacked jurisdiction to do anything but vacate the 
Judgment. See Peterson, l 53 Idaho at 163, 280 P.3d at 190. Cummings, in contrast, argued that 
Northern Title's request was "baseless." R., Vol. 1, p. 73. The district court disagreed, properly 
holding that Cummings' Judgment was void. Id. at p. 77. 19 
Second, the district court properly vacated Cummings' pre-appeal costs and fees. Due to 
the reversal, the district court held "there's no way I can hold the plaintiff as a prevailing party, 
and I find that Northern Title prevailed .... " Tr., 32: 15-18. Later that same day in its Minute 
Entry & Order, the district court ordered "Defendant Northern Title is the prevailing party." R., 
Vol. 1, p. 61.20 Thus, Rule 60(b )(5)21 was implicated. A district court may grant relief "from a 
19 In addition, the district court correctly relied upon I.R.C.P. 60(b )(5), finding that prospective 
application of the reversed Judgement would not be equitable. R., Vol. 1, p. 73. Cummings does 
not dispute these findings. 
20 Emphasis added. 
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1S on a or 
or if it is no longer the judgment should application. 128 
Idaho at 437, 914 P.2d at 934. As explained in Curl v. Curl, 115 Idaho 997, 1000, 772 P.2d 204, 
207 (1998), Rule 60(b)(5) directly applies when a change to a prior judgment renders a later 
judgment, in the same case, inappropriate. Id. 
That is what happened here. The Court reversed Cummings' Judgment, which rendered 
his subsequent judgment for costs and fees potentially improper. 22 That judgment for costs and 
fees became entirely improper when district court found that Cummings is not a prevailing 
party: 
It is discretionary. I am exerc1smg discretion . . . where after the 
Supreme Court's decision that said that it was wrong of me to award 50,000 
to the plaintiff, there's no way I can hold the plaintiff as a prevailing party, 
and I find that order the cost and fees as 
outlined below. 
Tr., Vol. 1, 32:10-18.23 Cummings does not dispute these findings. Therefore, where 
Cummings' prior Judgment was and his prevailing party status was changed, the 
21 Even if reliance on Rule 60(b )( 5) was somehow erroneous, Cummings is not a prevailing 
party. Therefore, his prior judgment for costs and fees is clearly inequitable. See e.g. I.R.C.P. 
60(b)(6). 
See Cummings I, R. Vol. 9, pp. 1805. ("[e]ach Count of Cummings' Amended Complaint 
sought damages for the failure to get what he bargained for - the property on the east side of the 
highway. The Court awarded him $50,000 for that failure. Therefore, Cummings did prove the 
gravamen of his case. He is the prevailing party as between Cummings and Northern Title"); see 
also R. Vol. 9, p. 1816. (Final Judgment on Costs and Fees, dated Apr. 12, 2013); Cf R. Vol. 8, 
p. 1586 (Final Judgment of $50,000, dated Jan. 22, 2013). 
23 Emphasis added. 
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prospective of his judgment costs and fees became inequitable. See I.R.C.P. 
60(b)(5). 24 
On appeal, the only basis that Cummings argues Rule 60(b) should not apply was 
because Northern Title did not show a "mistake of fact." Appellant's Brief, 8. Cummings misses 
the mark. He cites to Berg v. Kendall, 212 P.3d 1001, 1006-1007, 147 Idaho 571, 576-577 
(Idaho 2009), a case clearly distinguishable the fact that it involved Rule 60(b)(l), not Rule 
60(b)(4) or Rule 60(b)(5). Id. Northern Title's relief was not granted because of a mistake: 
[T]here are valid reasons for granting the motion, particularly under subsection 
( 4) because the two cha11enged judgments are void and subjection (5) because it is 
no longer equitable that the judgments should have prospective application given 
the subsequent rulings of the Idaho Supreme Court and this Court. 
R., Vol. 1, p. 77. 25 
24 Cummings does not argue whether his judgment for costs and fees was or was not a 
"prospective judgment." See Rudd v. Rudd, 105 Idaho 112, 118, 666 P.2d 639, 645 (1983). ("the 
crucial issues are whether the judgment has prospective application and whether it is no longer 
equitable that it have such application"). However, "any component of the order is a 
'prospective judgment,' and can be modified under Rule 60(b)(5), if it is susceptible to the legal 
or equitable rights of the parties as they evolve due to changes in law or circumstance." Meyers 
v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283,290,221 P.3d 81, 88 (Idaho 2009); see also Rudd, 105 Idaho at 119, 
666 P.2d at 646. (holding judgment's prospective features, such as being liened, were subject to 
Rule 60(b)(5)). Here, the judgment was recorded as a lien. See R. at Vol. 1, p. 76 ("judgments 
have been recorded"). Additionally, Cummings' status as a prevailing party was susceptible to 
change, as was his award of costs and fees. The district court found that Cummings was not a 
prevailing party, Tr., Vol. 1, 32: 10-18. Therefore, the district court's continued application of 
Cummings' costs and fees judgment would be inequitable. 
25 Even if Rule 60(b) was not the appropriate vehicle, any error was harmless. See I.R.C.P. 61 
The district court had ample authority to make the change under I.R.C.P. 54. A "final judgment" 
resolves all claims for relief, and that finality is not impacted by costs and fees. I.R.C.P. 54(a). 
Obviously then, the di.strict court's award to Northern Title of its pre-appeal costs and fees, see 
R., Vol. 1, p. 61 did not add finality to the case. Nor did the case become more "final" upon the 
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s was 
by 
Judgment void, Cummings' status as a prevailing party changed, making his judgment for costs 
and fees inequitable. 
ll. 's Rule 60(b) was 
"Whether a motion under Rule 60(b) is timely is an issue of fact for the district court." 
Davis v. Parrish, 131 Idaho 595,597,961 P.2d l 198, 1200 (1998). 
Northern Title's for Rule 60(b) was timely. Cummings argued that 
Northern Title was too late because "this matter is completed." R., Vol. 1, p. 73. The district 
court aptly reasoned, however, that "IRCP 60(b) is a post-judgment rule designed to be filed and 
decided after the case is completed." R., Vol. I, p. 76; see also I.R.C.P. 60(b). In contrast, 
Cummings gives no basis for accusing Northern Title of "tardiness." Appellant's Brief, 10. 
First, the district court expressly found that Northern Title's request was timely. See R., 
Vol.1, p. 76 ("[t]he is not untimely"). district court entered its Amended Final 
Judgment on Costs and Fees as Between Cwmnings and Northern Title on January 6, 2015. /d. at 
district court's later vacating of Cummings' Judgment. See R., Vol. 1, pp. 76-77. Rather, finality 
was fixed on entry of this Court's Opinion. The district court had denied "all of Cummings's 
claims against Northern Title except one," Cummings!, 157 Idaho at 353, 336 P.3d at 286, 
and the case became final when that one claim was reversed. See Hummer, 132 Idaho at 833, 979 
P.2d at 1191. ("the judgment of the appellate court is a final judgment in the cause, and the entry 
thereof in the lower court is a purely ministerial act"). Because the district court's award to 
Northern Title of its costs and fees did not add finality to the case, the same did not deprive the 
district court of its already existent jurisdiction to correct its prior orders of costs and fees. 
Where the district court was authorized under l.R.C.P. 54 to vacate Cummings' prior costs and 
fees, any error in reliance on post-judgment relief, LR.C.P. 60(b), was harmless. 
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court some id. at pp. 65-68, on 15 
its Third Final Judgment on and Fees as Between Cummings 
Northern Title. See R., Vol. l, pp. 67-68. 26 Northern Title's request for Rule 60(b) relief was 
thirty (30) after the the above judgments, and within nine (9) days 
after the last corrective judgment. Id. at 69-70. 27 Therefore, Northern Title was timely. 
district court did not err in finding that Northern Title's for Rule 60(b) ief 
was timely. Rule 60(b) relief is designed for "post-judgment" relief and Northern Title filed its 
motion a mere nine (9) days the final judgment. 
26 are obligated to ensure their own subject matter jurisdiction and must raise the issue 
sua sponte if necessary," In Re City of Slzelley, 15 l Idaho 289, 295, 255 P.3d 1175, 180 (Idaho 
2001 ), even "before all other questions, which includes the district court's subject matter 
jurisdiction." Steve v. Wo(le, 343 P.3d 497,502 (2015, Op. No. 18). The district court's award of 
Northern Title's costs on appeal was purely "ministerial" in nature. See Hummer, 132 Idaho at 
833,979 P.2d at 119 l. Yet in the district court's Third Arnended Judgments as to Fees and 
Costs Between Cwmnings and Northern Title, which simply accomplishes the ministerial act of 
adding Northern Title's costs and fees on appeal, the district court also revoked and declared that 
its prior final judgments relating to Northern Title's pre-appeal costs and fees were null and void. 
See R., Vol. I, pp. 67-68. The affect was a baseless toll on Cummings' time to appeal, which 
would otherwise be late. See I.AR. 14. Cummings has not assigned error to the district court for 
voiding Northern Title's prior judgments for costs and fees, and thus to the extent necessary the 
Court would need to address the issue, sua sponte. 
27 Cummings also baldly alleges that the district court granted Northern Title's request "without 
any opportunity for Cummings to respond to the substance of the motion." Appellant's Brief; 10. 
The argument is without merit. Cummings had the opportunity to respond, and did respond by 
filing an Objection to Northern Title's Rule 60(b) Motion. See R., Vol. 1, 72. The district court 
expressly addressed and denied Cummings' objections. Id. at 76-77. 
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Under Idaho Appellate Rules, Court has power to award costs and on appeal. See 
I.A.R. 40(a); see also id. at 41. As a matter of law, attorney fees are awarded to the prevailing 
if authorized by statute, contract, or rule. Capps, 149 Idaho at 240 P.3d at 590. 
(citations omitted). 
First, the Court should award Northern Title its fees on appeal because this matter falls 
the purview of a commercial see I.C. § l 120(3), and Cummings admits the 
same. See Appellant's Brief; 18. Alternatively, this Court should award Northern Title its costs 
and fees on appeal because Cummings' appeal is without merit. See I.C. § 12-123. 
As by the district court in response to Cummings' arguments below: 
OLSEN: So it [Northern Title] presented all of those issues in front of the 
Supreme Court in a petition for rehearing, and the Court denied 
that petition. so that in itself is a direction from the Court -
How? Couldn't it just as likely the Supreme saying, 
"We're not going to even address this because our prior opinions 
other cases make this very dear?" 
Tr., Vol. 1, 4:21-5:25. (emphasis added). 
Of note the case of Sky Canyon Properties, v. Golf Club at Black Rock, LLC, No. 
42216 (Sept. 30, 2015), a district court held that despite a reversal it did not have jurisdiction to 
consider fees and costs on remittitur, and this Court ordered the Administrative District Judge to 
appoint a new judge. Id. Similarly here Cummings has raises arguments regarding clearly 
established legal standards that are simply contrary to his position. 
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over 
Northern its 
transaction. Furthermore, 
established legal standards. 
CONCLUSION 
case 
IS argumg 
First, the district court clearly had jurisdiction to (l) determine prevailing party status, 
costs and fees, and (2) entertain a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate Cummings' judgments. This 
Court had reversed Cummings' one and only judgment, and after that reversal, the district court 
was empowered to correct its past orders, including the assessment of prevailing party status, 
costs and fees. Sec LR.C.P. 54; sec also Hutchins, 100 Idaho at 666, 603 P.2d at 1000. ("[a]fter a 
general reversal, a trial court is free to correct any error in its original findings and conclusions as 
to matters not passed on by the appellate court"). 
Second, in Cummings I the Court expressly that Judgment "must be 
reversed," Cummings I, 157 Idaho at 353,367,336 P.3d at 286, 300, and "[a] trial court has no 
authority to enter any judgment or order not in conformity with the order of the appellate court." 
Hwnmer, 132 Idaho at 833,979 P.2d at 1191. Therefore, the district court properly disregarded 
Cummings' vague request to rummage for an "other theory" for the judgment to stay alive. 
Third, because the district court had jurisdiction to correct its orders and enter judgments 
therewith, the district court clearly had jurisdiction to entertain Northern Title's request for Rule 
60(b) relief. In response, Cummings makes bald, vague accusations that Northern Title "failed 
to meet the burden of good cause for relief,'' and that Northern Title was 'tardy.' See Appellant's 
Brief 9-10. Nonetheless, there was good cause for reiief. Cummings was no longer a prevailing 
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his costs and \Vere 
the had not been. Therefore, the district court 
properly relied on Rule 60(b), "a post-judgment rule designed to be filed and decided after the 
case is completed." R., 1, p. 76. 
Finally, the Court should award Northern Title its costs and fees on appeal. Costs are 
provided as a matter of right, see LA.R. 41, and the underlying case involved a commercial 
transaction for which fees are appropriate. See LC.§ 12-120(3). In addition, Cummings' appeal 
is without merit, an unnecessary litigation over established standards of law. Id. at § 1 123. 
Northern Title respectfully requests that the Court deny Cummings' appeal, and award 
Northern Title its costs and fees on appeal. 
DATED this of December, 2015. 
BEARNSON & CALDWELL, LLC 
arnson 
. Bergman 
Attorneys for Respondent Northern Title 
Company of Idaho, Inc. 
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